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The Role of  the European Union in the  
International Trade and Investment Order
Abstract
The priority of  the EU in the international trade and investment order is to provide leadership in 
supporting the open, rules-based order at a time when it faces its most severe test since the 
establishment of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) more than 70 years ago. An 
effective EU policy on international trade and investment is important for the EU in terms of  
ensuring access to future growth markets and promoting sustainable development. But at the time 
of  major threats from both the United States and China, it is important for the EU to support an 
open, rules-based trading system. The EU cannot however, achieve this aim alone, and will need to 
cooperate with like-minded countries that share this broad aim. The EU’s capability to pursue a 
coherent policy in pursuit of  these general aims requires the establishment of  an effective trade 
policy regime that includes the Council of  Ministers, European Commission, and European 
Parliament. It also requires the (re)establishment of  a broad political consensus on the scope and 
aims of  EU trade and investment policy, something that can only be achieved with the full 
engagement of  member state governments and stakeholders in an informed debate.
Keywords
European Union, trade policy, global investment, GATT, rules-based trading system
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1. Introduction
The role of  the EU in the international trade and investment order is important for the 
representation of  the interests of  the EU and its member states, but also for the maintenance of  an 
open, rules-based international trade and investment order. For the EU and member states it is a 
means of  gaining and retaining EU access to major growth markets, something that is essential for 
the maintenance of  EU economic prosperity in the years and decades to come. Policymaking in this 
area is also central to the way the EU defines its ‘collective preferences’ and seeks to defend these in 
the context of  global production and investment. 
But the EU also has a vital interest in defending a rules-based trading system. The interests of  
China and the USA, the other two major poles, are not as closely associated with the maintenance 
of  a rules-based order as are those of  the EU. The scale of  China’s promotion of  industry and 
technology is such that it challenges the prevailing rules-based order in a manner that the strategic 
trade policies of  smaller emerging markets have not done in the past. The United States reversion 
to more unilateralist, power-based approach to trade under the Trump administration reflects a 
broader perception in the US that the existing rules no longer ensure a balance of  benefits 
compatible with US interests.1
One of  the key difficulties in current trade policy is that while most countries and policymakers say 
they support a rules-based system, there is no consensus on what a rules-based system should be. 
This paper therefore begins by identifying the normative roots of  the EU trade and investment 
policy, henceforth referred to as the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). These normative roots 
along with concrete economic factors shape the EU’s role in international trade and its interest in 
the maintenance of  a balanced, stable, rules-based order. The paper then discusses the challenges to 
such a rules-based trading system emanating from the United States and China. The ability of  the 
EU to respond to these challenges will depend upon its capabilities, so these are then assessed 
before the EU’s response to these international challenges are discussed. The EU’s ability to pursue 
a consistent and coherent role in international trade and investment is dependent on maintaining a 
broad internal consensus on the scope and aims of  the CCP. There therefore follows coverage of  
the internal challenges facing the EU in terms of  decision-making.
2. The EU’s Normative Preference in Trade and Investment 
2.1 A rules-based system
The CCP is shaped by a set of  norms that the EU and its member states have evolved as part of  a 
wider Organisation for Economic Co-operaton and Development (OECD) club model. The 
post-1945 trading system was shaped by the developed OECD economies. This was leadership by 
like-minded countries with an Atlantic focus. The rules were in particular developed at a plurilateral 
1  A power-based trading system is one in which the willingness to use economic or market power predominates. 
Fairness in the system is then defined by the most powerful countries rather than a system of  rules agreed upon 
through cooperation and codified in multilateral or other types of  agreement.
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level and took the form of  soft law codes or best practice. The rules, such as those developed in the 
OECD, were then generally multilateralised in more binding GATT rules.2 Importantly for an 
understanding of  the EU role in trade and investment, these codes and best practice then adapted 
to the specifics of  creating a European market and were adopted into hard law in the shape of  the 
acquis communautaire. The acquis then largely shaped EU preferences in trade in the CCP. This was 
often with a lag, such as in the case of  investment where there was a lack of  formal exclusive EU 
competence (Woolcock, 2006). There was thus a synergistic relationship between developments in 
the EU and international norms and standards.3 This use of  international norms by the EU and 
thus the close synergy between international and the EU rules (the acquis communautaire) should 
come as no surprise because the main EU member states have been active participants in the 
OECD, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), World Customs Organization, as 
well as all being members of  the World Trade Organization (WTO) and contracting parties to the 
GATT before that. The EU ‘normative power’ in trade is therefore to a significant degree due to its 
implementation in hard law of  the predominantly voluntary norms developed internationally. It is 
not in seeking to ‘export’ an exclusively EU model to the rest of  the world, as is the often-heard 
criticism of  the EU. Another way of  looking at this is to argue that the EU is not a super state in 
trade but rather part of  a multi-layer process of  building a system of  stable trade rules. 
In the past, progress in developing trade rules largely depended on US and EU cooperation, 
although all OECD countries participated. The legitimacy of  this shared leadership of  the trading 
system depended on it delivering the international public good of  an open trading system. The 
emerging markets of  the 1960s and 1970s in the shape of  Japan (reemerging), Korea (the Republic 
of) and other Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) were content to be rule takers because the 
system helped ensure open markets for their exports on which their development depended. When 
the USA threatened to restrict access for Japanese exports based on ‘fair trade’ arguments in the 
1980s, Japan moved to a policy of  more explicit support for multilateral rules to contain US 
unilateralism. It was Canada that proposed and the EU and Japan that supported a stronger WTO 
in order to discipline US unilateral definitions of  ‘fair trade’ (Van Grasstek, 2013). 
In other words the EU’s role in the international trading system has to date been very much as a 
part of  the OECD club model in which the key counterparty was the USA. Over time the EU 
assumed a more important role in shared leadership of  the club and, by the mid-1990s, had 
aspirations of  leadership. It was the EU that pushed for a millennium round of  multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTN) from 1996 onwards, at a time when the US was already showing clear signs of  
disenchantment with ‘multilateralism’4 and moving towards a policy of  competitive liberalisation.5
2  For example, the qualified most favoured nation (MFN) codes on technical barriers to trade (TBTs), subsidies, 
government procurement, and customs procedures adopted in the Tokyo round of  the GATT were based on rules 
developed in the OECD.
3  This can be seen can be seen in the close similarity between the EU and international trade rues and standards as well 
as in the application in the European Social Charter, which is based on International Labour Organization standards. 
The EU applies the standards and principles of  the World Customs Organization in its internal customs procedures 
as well as in preferential trade agreements.
4  As indicated in the text the GATT was part multilateral (the application of  MFN to tariffs) and partly plurilateral 
(rule-making)
5  The idea of  competitive liberalization, or using alternative preferential means of  promoting liberal trade, was aired in 
1996 (Bergsten, 1996)
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The EU’s vested interest in maintaining an open, rules-based trading system is therefore, in part, 
because the EU norms and approach to market integration draw on those developed internationally. 
The nature of  EU decision-making also means the EU is heavily inclined towards a rules-based 
order, because of  the lack of  sufficient member state support for power-based trade policy. 
Decision-making is formally by a qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council (and a simple 
majority in the European Parliament). But in practice the EU works by consensus and there is 
always a sufficient number of  member states ready to block the threat or use of  market closure as 
part of  a more power-based strategy. The EU single market is also based on a broad liberal 
consensus that has precluded active interventionist policies at the EU level. The EU cannot 
therefore match the more power-based approach of  the US in which the current administration 
uses the threat of  market closure to get concessions from its trading partners, or China’s large-scale 
investment in strategic trade policies (discussed below) and must rely on a rules-based trading 
system to defend its interests. 
2.2 Regional integration
The normative roots of  the CCP are also in European economic integration. The CCP stems from 
the establishment of  the customs union, and thus the requirement to adopt a common external 
tariff  (CET). The customs union is the foundation stone of  European economic and political 
integration. As the international trade agenda moved beyond tariffs to include first non-tariff  
measures and then to services and regulatory policies and standards, the EU member states opted 
to negotiate with one voice. This began as early as the Kennedy round of  the GATT (1964–67), 
and continued through the Tokyo (1974–79) and Uruguay (1986–94) rounds. The European 
Economic Community (EEC), European Community and finally the EU negotiated as one, even 
on topics that were not exclusive EU competences, in order to ensure that member states did not 
adopt different positions and thus limit or undermine the common—later the single—market.6 
This was, for example, the case for technical barriers to trade (TBTs), state subsidies, government 
procurement, and customs procedures in the Tokyo round. It was true for services, some aspects 
of  investment and intellectual property rights in the Uruguay round. In other words, the CCP is 
inextricably linked to EU integration.
The normative preference for regional integration is also reflected in the CCP through efforts to 
conclude region-to-region trade agreements. The EU has been called the “patron saint of  regional 
integration” (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004). Thus the EU has sought to negotiate region-to-region 
agreements with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, with ASEAN, and with Central 
America, but with mixed success.7 Delays and competition in the shape of  other major economies 
6  This has a relevance for the debate on the scope of  EU competence, or power, because a common voice and thus a 
common position in external trade established de facto competence for the EU and thus favoured the establishment 
of  formal exclusive EU competence for the policy area concerned. For more details see Eeckout, 2011 and Devuyst, 
2013.
7  In practice, region-to-region trade agreements have been possible with regions in which integration was already fairly 
well advanced, such as the East African Community/Union and the Caribbean. The EU approach to other Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) was controversial in that some saw them as impeding regional integration. 
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negotiating bilateral agreements with members of  regional groupings and thus gaining first-mover 
advantages has resulted in the EU following suit, but with the ultimate aim of  concluding wider 
region-to-region agreements. 
To sum up, the EU’s role in the international trading system has been as a progressively more 
important member of  the OECD club. It took emerging international norms and standards and 
applied them in binding European legislation. European integration is therefore embedded in the 
rules-based system. The EU does not have the option of  an easy shift back to more power-based 
trade and investment policy. In short it is in the EU’s vital interests that an open, rules based trading 
order is maintained.
3. Challenges to a Rules-Based Trading System
There are a number of  challenges to the rules-based, open trading system. In terms of  the structure 
of  world trade it has been the growth of  China in particular, 
and the emerging markets in general, that has undermined the 
legitimacy of  the OECD club model. This model based its 
credibility and legitimacy on the fact that the economies 
concerned were large enough to generate positive externalities 
for smaller trading partners through the establishment of  an 
open trading system. This output legitimacy compensated for 
the fact that it was an exclusive club model. With the growth of  China and other emerging markets 
and the relative decline in the OECD’s share of  world trade, this is no longer the case. 8
3.1 US return to power-based trade policy
At the international level, the immediate challenge is the shift towards more power-based policies in 
the United States. This is based on a view that the existing rules are ‘unfair’ on the USA. Rather 
than seek joint gains from negotiating changes in the trading regime, the Trump administration has 
pursued a pure value-claiming trade strategy. This has taken the form of  threats to close the US 
market, backed by a willingness to carry out such threats. As a result, the Trump administration has 
withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), recast NAFTA (as UMSCA, the United States 
Mexico Canada Agreement) and is threatening the viability of  the WTO.
The question that arises is whether this is a phenomenon of  the Trump administration or a more 
enduring feature of  US policy. While President Trump has taken the use of  unilateral actions based 
on claims of  ‘unfairness’ to an extreme, it is not the first time the US has pursued such policies. The 
so-called ‘Nixon shock’ in August 1971 included a 10 percent tariff  across the board in order to 
8  In concrete terms, the WTO has failed to conclude the Doha Development Round due in large part to the inability 
to differentiate between countries according to their level of  development. The leading OECD economies and in 
particular the US are no longer ready to tolerate free-riding, but the emerging economies continue to claim developing 
country status.
The EU has a vital interest  
in defending a rules-based  
trading system.
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force Japan and West Germany, which had trade surpluses with the US, to revalue their currencies. 
During the 1980s the US applied unilateral measures under Section 301 of  the 1974 Trade Act 
(then a catch-all measure to address “unfair trade”) as leverage in the negotiation of  “voluntary 
export restraints” as a form of  managed trade to reduce the US trade deficits (at that time with 
Japan). In the 1980s, as today, such a power-based strategy has been used in the pursuit of  a 
narrowly defined aim of  reciprocity. A narrow definition here means bilateral reciprocity in cases of  
US trading partners having a trade surplus.
It remains to be seen if  the current policy will endure.9 What differs this time around is that it is the 
executive branch that is pushing unilateral measures based on vague justifications of  national 
security.10 In the past the executive provided a check on unilateralist pressures in the US Congress.11 
In the first two years of  the Trump administration, Congress has failed to act as a check on the 
executive. There is clearly not much left of  the belief  that the US has a role in providing leadership 
for the international trading system. President Trump is also openly attacking the European model 
of  integration, which is based on shared sovereignty and binding obligations and has been 
supported by every US administration since Kennedy’s.
3.2 The Chinese challenge
The challenge from China is less short-term but no less real. China is using its financial and 
economic strength to pursue a strategic trade policy on a scale that cannot easily be reconciled with 
the existing trade rules.12 When it opened its economy during the 1980s and 90s and joined the 
WTO in 2000, China could be said to have been supporting the established trading system. On 
accession to the WTO China accepted binding commitments and a lower average, most favoured 
nation (MFN) tariff  of  below 10 percent, compared to other emerging markets such as India, 
Brazil, and many developing countries, which can have much higher bound tariffs.13 It was in 
China’s interest to join the WTO because the country benefitted from the open trading system. The 
reform-minded leaders of  the Communist Party also saw in WTO membership an opportunity to 
justify and promote domestic reform. In more recent times, President Xi has also claimed that with 
the US administration turning its back on multilateralism, China can assume a leading role.
But what does China understand by the rules-based trading system? It has signed up to 
commitments on tariffs, but the WTO provisions on non-tariff  measures are less binding and more 
open to interpretation. If  one considers the content of  China’s preferential agreements concluded 
9  See ‘What Trump’s America First Policy means for the International Trading System’ https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
usappblog/2018/10/17/what-trumps-american-first-policy-means-for-the-international-trading-system/.
10  In fact it is a relatively small group of  political appointees and the President that have brought about the shift in US 
policy. Whether the policy endures depends on whether sector interests and the US Congress can reassert themselves 
and provide more checks and balances. 
11  In the literature this had been explained by the ideational commitment to free (or shall we say open) trade on the part 
of  the president/executive branch (Keohane and Goldstein, 1993)
12  For a description of  strategic trade policies see Krugman, 1986. These use domestic support in the shape of  
subsidies, preferential treatment for national suppliers, and the promotion of  state-owned champions to enhance the 
competitive position of  national industries and thus achieve economies of  scale.
13  India’s average applied tariff  is only 13.4 percent while its average bound MFN tariff  is 48.5 percent (WTO tariff  
data as of  2018).
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since 2000, these do not contain any binding obligation that limits China’s ability to pursue a 
strategic trade policy. In other words China’s idea of  what the rules should be differs considerably 
from that of  the EU.
China also represents a challenge in the sense that it appears to be moving from a policy based on 
domestic development towards one based on economic statecraft. China now appears much more 
willing to use its economic weight to gain political influence and project power. As in the case of  
the US, it can be argued that this is only a readjustment or a temporary trend. There also remain 
doubts about the sustainability of  the Chinese model of  state-led capitalism. But opinion in Europe 
(following that in the USA) seems to be shifting from a benign 
view of  Chinese economic strength to one that sees China as 
more of  a threat. China is becoming a major source of  
outward investment, which can be used to gain influence—
such as through the well-publicised Chinese investment in 
some EU member states.14 It can use Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) to acquire advanced technology as part of  
its strategic trade policy. It also has a large domestic market 
that is less open than that of  the EU (or the US). With centralised decision-making it can also make 
full use of  the carrot of  market access and the stick of  closure to maximize leverage in trade and 
investment relations.
4. The EU’s Capabilities 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of  what the EU response should be to these challenges, 
how capable is the EU of  acting? Here is not the place to rehearse the debate about EU actorness 
(Scheler, 2014), but the ability of  the EU to shape agendas and outcomes in international trade is 
clearly important. 
There are various metrics for this. The size of  the EU market is clearly one factor, at 16.9 percent 
(or 14.54 when the UK leaves) of  world GDP, the EU weighs in as one of  the heavyweights (China 
17.1 percent, USA 15.8 percent), but its share is declining. In terms of  the share of  world trade in 
goods the EU accounts for 15 percent (excluding intra-EU trade) of  world trade (15.7 percent of  
exports and 2016 and 14.8 percent of  imports), but here the EU share has declined more rapidly 
over the past decade, as has that of  the USA. This is an indicator of  the shift in the focus of  world 
trade from the Atlantic to Asia Pacific.
 The old adage that what counts in trade is what you bring to the table still holds. In other words, 
power or the ability to get concessions from others depends on a party’s ability to make offers or 
concessions. So governments of  relatively closed economies have more bargaining power than 
those of  open economies. In this respect the emerging market economies are generally in a stronger 
14  See Deutsche Welle Exit the Dragon? 5 February 2018 https://www.dw.com/en/exit-the-dragon-chinese-
investment-in-germany/a-42457712
The growth of  China in particular 
and the emerging markets in general 
has undermined the legitimacy of  the 
OECD club model.
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position than developing economies had been in the past. The EU has an average, trade-weighted 
bound MFN tariff  of  3 percent. There are only a few sectors in which the EU still has leverage on 
tariffs, such as agriculture, cars, and textiles. It is liberal in terms of  investment and services. In 
terms of  regulatory impediments to trade, the EU has fairly rigorous requirements, so has some 
leverage in this area, but the acquis means that exporters generally need only to comply with one 
set of  standards or regulations to access the whole single market. This is trade facilitating, as is the 
EU tendency to use international standards. In other words the EU, like most OECD economies, 
has relatively limited market access concessions to offer. Compared to the US, the EU member 
states are also more—and in some cases much more—trade dependent. 
EU bargaining power has also been shaped by the cohesion and dynamism of  integration. This was 
the case in the 1960s with the creation of  a common market and common external tariff  (CET). 
During the Kennedy round of  the GATT between 1963 and 1969, the EEC, as it then was, was 
able to negotiate tariff  concessions from the United States15 
that had not been possible before. During the Uruguay round 
between 1986 and 1994, the dynamism of  the single market 
programme again enabled the EU to have a considerable 
impact on shaping trade policy agendas and outcomes. These 
periods contrast with the 1970s and the period after 2000 when there was little or no integration 
dynamic, and as a result the EU had less impact on outcomes. After the 2008 financial crisis, the 
integration dynamic slowed further. The implications of  the euro crisis and a lack of  common 
approaches to inward migration have created centrifugal forces, a populist backlash against what is 
seen to be an EU policy elite, and Brexit. How to restore an integration dynamic is beyond the 
scope of  this paper. The point here is that the EU would enhance its bargaining power and thus its 
ability to shape outcomes if  it could regain an integration dynamic.
The degree of  flexibility in terms of  the negotiating strategies it can pursue in trade is another 
factor. In this respect the EU is more constrained than most WTO members because of  the need 
for decisions to be based on at least QMV of  the EU member states, and in most cases now a 
majority of  the European Parliament.16 In practice the EU operates by consensus, at least on major 
decisions. This means the EU cannot wield the stick of  threatening market closure, except in cases 
of  compensation when other WTO members infringe the rules. There has always been a group of  
liberal member states that has opposed such a power-based strategy. The UK leaving will diminish 
the group of  mostly northern liberal member states, but this is likely to still be strong enough to 
preclude purely power-based strategies.17 The EU negotiators are therefore left with little option 
15  During the 1950s the US held back from further tariff  liberalization following the establishment of  the GATT (Dür, 
2010).
16  One important exception here is that of  anti-dumping actions, where over time the more defensive member state 
governments have moved decision making to a simple majority to block the adoption of  definitive dumping duties 
from a position in which a qualified majority was needed.
17  Two examples illustrate this point: 1) The Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR), which was seen as the EU response to 
the US Section 301, the unilateralist fair trade legislation of  the USA recently used against China. But the use of  this 
was made conditional upon first pursuing WTO remedies and on a qualified majority vote. The TBR has never been 
used. And 2) in public procurement, where there have been efforts dating back to 1994 to enable the EU to threaten 
closure of  the EU market as a means of  achieving a level playing field in procurement. The Directive on International 
Trade in Procurement, proposed in 2010, has however continued to languish. 
The EU cannot easily match  
the Chinese strategic trade policy.
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but to pursue value-creating (win-win) negotiating strategies. Another way of  looking at this is to 
see the EU’s decision-making as providing less scope for discretionary measures than most of  its 
trading partners. Chinese trade diplomacy has been described as ‘fragmented authoritarianism’, but 
China is still a unitary state. In addition, as recent US trade policy has shown, the US executive 
retains some scope for discretionary action. In other words, the other major trading powers of  the 
USA and China have either market power or a willingness and ability to use discretionary power in 
the pursuit of  their national interests. The EU has less market power than China, and is unwilling 
or unable to use discretionary power due to the need to find consensus among the member states. 
The scope of  EU exclusive competence is also a factor in bargaining power. The Lisbon treaty 
extended exclusive competence to cover foreign direct investment, which enhanced the potential 
leverage of  the EU. However, as will be discussed below, the lack of  an internal consensus on what 
EU investment policy should be has meant that this leverage was not exploited. Another limiting 
factor is that the member states still compete in both attracting inward FDI and seeking contracts 
in third markets, as do the states in the US and other federal states and private companies 
everywhere in seeking contracts. In terms of  investment policy vis-à-vis China, the EU’s recent 
efforts to coordinate the screening of  inward investment may mean some greater coherence with 
regard to inward investment, but they are limited to national security considerations and do not 
compare with the ability of  the Chinese government to direct inward FDI to favour national 
development aims (Copenhagen Economics, 2018). Even the USA has stronger measures in the 
shape of  the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
It has been argued that the EU has normative power (Manners, 2006). This can be seen as derived 
from the EU model of  creating a single open market and creating the regulatory framework to 
facilitate trade while pursuing other policy objectives. As discussed above, in the context of  trade 
and investment EU normative power is related to how it takes norms developed at the international 
level and incorporates and implements them in EU rules.18 In other words, the strength of  the EU 
as a normative power depends in part on these norms and thus the continuation of  a rules-based 
trading system.
Although not directly related to bargaining power, it is worth observing that just as the EU cannot 
easily pursue a power-based strategy, nor can it match the Chinese strategic trade policy. For this, 
the EU would need interventionist instruments to promote EU champions. There are limited 
instruments available at the EU level for such purposes, and past debates on the need for EU 
industrial strategies or technology policies have made little or no progress.19 Even if  there were a 
consensus to do so, the member state governments would simply not have the resources to match 
what the Chinese government has been willing and able to spend supporting its national champions 
in recent times.20
18  Normative power has been seen as “not just a European project—it is part of  a global effort to coordinate and 
reconcile human differences under conditions of  globalisation” (Manners op. cit p. 168, citing Kristeva).
19  The recent proposal for a new Industrial Policy Strategy is a series of  measures aimed at improving the framework 
conditions rather than a strategic trade strategy, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/new-industrial-
policy-strategy-2017-sep-18_en
20  There is a debate as to the sustainability of  this policy given the level of  public debt in China.
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To sum up, the EU’s bargaining power is in relative decline. It has already liberalised more than 
many WTO members and therefore has less to offer in terms of  concessions than the emerging 
powers, such as China. The nature of  EU trade policy decision-making means that it does not have 
the option of  following the US and reverting to a more power-based trade strategy. Contrary to 
China, the EU does not have the capability to pursue a strategic trade policy. The EU’s interests 
therefore lie in sustaining a rules-based order. The interaction between international norms and the 
EU acquis is also an important component in the EU’s normative power.21 Even when it comes to 
retaliation against unilateral measures taken by others, such as in the case of  the US tariffs on steel 
and aluminium, the EU response has been to do the utmost to keep within WTO rules.22
5. The Domestic Challenges
At the domestic level, the EU has the challenge of  defining the scope and objectives of  trade and 
investment policy in the context of  majoritarian—as opposed to the interest based—trade politics 
(discussed below) that has hitherto been predominant. Other WTO members, such as the United 
States, face similar domestic challenges. To have a credible EU trade strategy in response to the 
current challenges, it is necessary to have a broad consensus on the scope and aims of  policy and 
trust in domestic decision-making. This has been questioned recently.23 
The EU’s ability to respond to the challenges it faces internationally are determined by domestic 
factors. Here we shall focus on two key factors: the dynamism of  European integration or the 
centrifugal forces it is currently facing, and what should be the EU’s collective preferences on trade 
and investment policy. Closely linked to this second factor is how or who should define EU 
preferences.
5.1 What should be the scope of  the CCP?
Trade and investment policy has reached progressively deeper into domestic (and EU) policy 
autonomy. This necessitates a balance between the commercial or economic interests on the one 
hand and retaining the ‘right to regulate’ in the pursuit of  other legitimate, domestic policy 
objectives, on the other. “(T)he aim … is to ensure that economic growth goes hand in hand with 
social justice, respect for human rights, high labour and environmental standards and health and 
safety’ (Cremona, 2017). The challenge is to deliver on this aim. Such a balance has always been 
implicit in trade rules, but the need to define or redefine the balance has become more urgent. The 
current EU trade agenda is also influenced by how to use trade and investment measures as a 
means of  pursuing other policy objectives internationally, such as sustainable development, human 
rights, and EU foreign policy aims.24 This is a continuous process, and the issues concerning the 
21  The argument here is that the EU can be effective in shaping international norms and thus the rules-based order if  
its norms or regulatory standards are in the mainstream of  international norm- or standards-making. If  the EU 
approach diverges too far from international norms, it is likely to have less normative power.
22  The EU response to the US tariffs was justified under Article 8 of  the Safeguards Agreement of  the WTO.
23  A concrete illustration of  this is how the EU negotiated comprehensive trade and investment agreements with 
Canada and Singapore, only to face difficulties having these ratified. 
24  The human rights objective is set out in the Treaty of  Lisbon (TFEU) Art 3(5) and elsewhere. Art 207 states that EU 
trade policy must be guided by the principles established in Art 3(5). The EU also has a policy of  including a human 
rights clause in all preferential trade agreements it concludes.
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balance need to be discussed in relation to specific topics. But stakeholder trust in the decision-
making is crucial. The following section assesses the factors that determine EU decision-making on 
trade.
5.2 Who decides on the rules in the EU?
In all the time trade rules under the GATT were focused on MFN and national treatment, the 
politics of  trade policy was shaped by the aim of  a broadly defined reciprocity. Reciprocal market 
opening was determined by GATT contracting parties (CPs) making mutual concessions on tariff  
reductions, which were then extended on an MFN basis to other GATT CPs. The politics of  trade 
was predominantly interest based. National preferences were defined by balancing offensive against 
defensive interests and these were then aggregated at the EC/EU level. Sectors with a comparative 
or competitive advantage sought access to export markets, and those without sought protection. 
When a major competitor country gained preferential access to a third country market the EU 
preference was to achieve a level playing. 
The political economy of  trade took on the classical form of  concentrated costs, for instance of  
imports in the agricultural, steel, or clothing industries, but diffuse benefits for the users of  such 
inputs or final consumers through lower prices. There were also benefits for competitive sectors 
such as transport equipment and machinery, science-based sectors such as pharmaceuticals, or 
services in which the EU had a strong competitive position. In this model, consumers and voters 
suffer from a collective action problem. The sector-specific nature of  trade meant that capital and 
labour often shared a common interest in pressing for protection, but consumers and the wider 
voting public had little incentive or ability to engage in decision-making. Trade officials sought the 
best balance in the national interest, with input from politicians. At the EC/EU level in the Council 
working group on trade (now the Trade Policy Committee (TPC)) then decided on the EU 
preference on the basis of  a proposal from the commission trade officials. Decision-making was 
therefore ‘technocratic’ (Woolcock, 2014) and two steps removed from consumers or voters,25 first 
at the EU level of  aggregation and then the international level of  negotiation between the EU and 
its trading partners. As a result, the collective action problem was especially pronounced, which 
made for trade politics shaped by the interaction between interests and officials the core of  the EU 
policymaking process.26 
An EU decision-making regime emerged in which the key stakeholders (trade policy officials and 
the fairly specialised trade policy community in the EU) understood how decisions were taken and 
trusted that these would—on balance and over time—reflect their interests. Decisions were almost 
always based on consensus so the process would go through various iterations until a final 
consensus could be reached. Ideational factors played a role, but more indirectly and in the sense 
that some member states, such Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, Demark, and especially Germany 
25  Not as a means of  ensuring autonomy for the EU process, but as a result of  the nature of  taking decisions for the 6, 
9, 12, or 28 member states.
26  Some academic analysis of  EU trade policy has put forward the view that the EU institutions were purposely given 
autonomy to decide on policy in order to prevent protectionist capture. But this is an over simplification. The 
distancing of  policymaking was in many respects a practical result of  taking decisions at an EC/EU level.
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mostly favoured more liberal policies and others such as Italy, France, and Spain generally favoured 
more mercantilist approaches. The differences were in how broadly to define reciprocity, with the 
liberals taking a relaxed or broader view and the less liberal a narrower or more mercantilist 
position.
5.3 Towards a new trade politics
This interest-based politics shaped EU preferences even as non-tariff  measures became more 
prevalent in trade policy. Regulatory policies such as technical regulations, standards, or food and 
sanitary standards were generally seen as technical barriers to trade. The inherent tension between 
the aim of  regulatory policies to promote public policy objectives, such as social cohesion, 
consumer safety, or environmental protection on the one hand, and market opening on the other 
was already the subject of  policy debate. But it was still at a ‘technical’ level between trade officials 
and the respective EU and member state regulatory bodies or 
agencies. Balance was sought in the form of  concepts such as 
proportionality, least trade-restrictive measures, or non-
discrimination in the form of  national treatment. As noted 
above, in promoting these concepts, the EU followed 
international norms and standards on topics such as TBTs, 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and public 
procurement in the acquis communautaire. But the EU 
developed these norms and standards further, such as by developing the concept of  mutual 
recognition as a means of  dealing with divergent national regulations. The acquis then became the 
EU preference in trade negotiations.
A change in trade politics began when awareness of  the trade-off  between market opening and 
regulation began to emerge during the 1990s. Civil society actors began to resolve the collective 
action problem by engaging a wider set of  stakeholders through information and advocacy 
campaigns and seeking to shape the debate about trade policy preferences. Environmental non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) were the first to emerge, arguing that trade policy did not 
account for environmental externalities. Development NGOs argued that policies based on 
reciprocity were undermining the development aims of  developing countries. For organised labour, 
the growth of  global production and value chains brought an end to the shared interests with 
capital in specific sectors as global supply chains led to the off-shoring of  jobs in manufacturing 
from which trade unions drew most of  their support. The effect of  these civil society NGOs’ 
efforts to shape national and EU preferences helped shift the politics of  trade (and investment) 
from a predominantly interest-based to a more majoritarian politics.27
It is this shift to more-majoritarian trade politics that poses a major ‘domestic’ challenge for the EU 
(and the member state governments). In order to respond to the systemic challenges discussed 
above, the EU needs to have credibility. But the broader, more majoritarian trade politics in the EU 
27  This is sometimes seen as a politicisation of  trade, but trade policy has always been politicised. “What has changed 
has been the actors engaged in the process. 
Among developed OECD economies 
there appears to be growing  
support for plurilateral initiatives as 
a means of  making progress.
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makes defining ‘trade for all’ more difficult, and requires the integration of  the European 
Parliament, which has become a conduit for civil society engagement in the EU decision making 
regime. The tensions between the broader strategic aims of  the EU in international trade and the 
domestic debate on the balance between trade/economic interests and the ‘right to regulate’ came 
to light in the debate on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA) and the 
EU–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA).28 Negotiating trade agreements with these strategic 
partners was part of  the EU Global Europe policy, enunciated in 2006, to negotiate trade 
agreements with strategic partners. They were also a response to the weakening of  the WTO 
system and arguably an effort to re-establish shared leadership of  the trading system with the US. 
But both initiatives became the focus of  debate on how EU trade and investment policy should 
reconcile trade and economic interest and regulatory objectives. 
6. So what role for the EU?
The EU’s role in trade and investment is as a supporter of  a rules-based, open trade and investment 
order because this is in line with EU interests. Based on the points made above, the EU definition 
of  a rules-based system importantly rest on taking the soft law international norms, such as those 
developed in the OECD, GATT, the International Labour Organization, World Customs 
Organisation, the World Intellectual Property Organisation or multilateral environment agreements 
(MEAs) and implementing them in hard law. While some other countries have used the 
international norms, the EU approach is to go further and be more comprehensive.
It is in the EU’s interests to ensure compatibility between its model and the wider international 
trading system and to ensure that other countries support a similar set of  norms and standards. A 
case can also be made that EU normative power depends on it being in the mainstream of  
international rule-making. Another way of  looking at this is that the EU member states have 
accepted the need to pool some regulatory autonomy or sovereignty in order to keep pace with the 
internationalisation of  markets. Having done so at a regional level makes this easier at the 
international level, provided the international rules are consistent with those of  the EU.
The EU also has an interest in a rules-based order because its relative market power is declining as 
the centre of  gravity of  the world economy moves further from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific 
region. The EU was never a hegemonic trade power, but has shared leadership in trade. The shift to 
Asia has been eroding the viability of  the shared US–EU leadership function in trade, something 
that the recent shift in US trade policy appears to have confirmed. The nature of  EU decision-
making makes it difficult if  not impossible to emulate the US in pursuing a power-based trade 
strategy. Equally, there is no consensus in favour of  the kind of  intervention needed for the EU to 
pursue a strategic trade policy.
28  The tensions over the EU–Singapore FTA reflected those between the EU institutions in the shape of  the question 
of  exclusive competence. It is interesting to note that the EU–Japan agreement attracted very little public debate and 
criticism.
|   Dahrendorf Forum Working Paper No. 10 | 11 April 201913
7. But What Rules?
At the international level, the EU interest is in the effective application of  the established 
international norms and standards. But do these match the current EU collective preference? Is the 
balance between commercial and other legitimate policy objectives the right one, or is there a need 
for adjustment? What should be the balance in new areas of  policy such as digital trade and 
e-commerce? These questions have both domestic (or EU internal) and international dimensions.
7.1 The domestic EU level
Within the EU, there is a need to establish and maintain a broad consensus on the aims and scope 
of  trade and investment policy. This necessitates a balance between the pursuit of  economic/
commercial aims, in particular maintaining access for EU exports and investment to future growth 
markets. This will be needed to sustain EU economic prosperity on the one hand, and legitimate 
social and environmental aims on the other. Maintaining such a balance is an ongoing process and 
involves an acceptance of  the need for adjustment. The EU could be said to be going through a 
sometimes-painful correction away from the (neo)liberal paradigm that shaped policy in the 1980s 
through the mid-2000s, towards a balance that gives more weight to sustainable development and 
the right to regulate. This is illustrated by, for example, the shift in investment policy that took place 
in response to the debate over TTIP away from a policy based on the market and protection of  
investors towards a greater role for public policy and the right to regulate. 
Defining the EU collective preference in terms of  the rules is a continuous process, so there is a 
need to (re)establish trust in the decision-making process on the part of  all stakeholders. This is 
also necessary because of  the changes resulting from the implementation of  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU), in particular the need to integrate the European 
Parliament into the EU decision-making regime, a process that is still not complete. The 
Commission and, with some hesitation, the Council has also introduced more transparency that 
should facilitate the open and informed public debate that is needed to respond to the shift towards 
majoritarian politics in EU trade and investment. But the EU institutions cannot carry this debate 
alone; the member state governments must engage more. All too often, member state governments 
or populist politicians deflect opposition to ‘globalisation’ to the EU when in fact it is the member 
states that fully share responsibility for the policy. The debate on the role of  trade and investment 
policy must also find a balance between the multiple objectives set out in the TFEU, namely the 
promotion of  economic growth and an open trading system, as well as human rights and 
sustainable development. 
At the EU level it is also necessary to take the question of  adjustment to changes in comparative 
and competitive advantage more seriously. The shift to more-liberal policies led to a reduction in 
the willingness to manage adjustment. At both the member state and EU levels, structural policies 
that could ease the costs of  adjustment have been insufficient and sometimes largely token. The 
austerity measures following the 2008 financial crisis have further weakened the general social safety 
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net. In other words, the ability to bring about adjustment to shifts in the pattern of  trade and 
international competition has been reduced. Neither the member states nor the EU has adequate 
structural or adjustment policies compared to those of  the 1970s or early 1980s. A consequence has 
been that those affected by shifts in trade or the growth of  global value chains have been 
susceptible to populist arguments opposing EU policy.
7.2 The international level
On the international dimension there is equally a need to establish a broad consensus on the scope 
and balance of  trade and investment rules. At the multilateral level, which here means the WTO, 
the role of  the EU must include support for the WTO and the continuation of  a strong multilateral 
order. This is needed to prevent a drift back to a more power-based trade or malign mercantilism.29 
The reference here is to current US power-based and Chinese strategic trade policies. In the short 
term the EU has acted by supporting the ‘friends of  
multilateralism’ group of  developed and developing country 
members of  the WTO and has tabled a number of  proposals 
on how to strengthen the WTO (European Commission, 
2018). In the short term this can be seen as part of  an effort 
to engage the US and thus head off  more unilateral action by 
the current administration, which has made vague threats 
about leaving the WTO.30 Another short-term need is to find a way of  unblocking the freeze on 
appointments to the appellate body to the WTO, which the US has brought about. If  this cannot 
be done, the dispute settlement function of  the WTO is in real danger of  being sidelined.
The EU has supported medium-term proposals to make the WTO more effective by moving ahead 
on reforms of  the dispute settlement procedures and proposing a strengthening and rationalisation 
of  WTO committees. In an effort to make progress on the negotiating front, the EU has lent its 
support for initiatives, such as on e-commerce.31 Among developed OECD economies there 
appears to be growing support for plurilateral initiatives as a means of  making progress. Plurilateral 
initiatives are those taken by a limited group of  WTO members. In those sections of  US opinion 
that see the need for the trade rules to keep pace with developments in the world economy, there is 
a solid consensus in favour of  plurilateralism.32 This is based on the view that there will only be 
progress if  a group of  like-minded countries moves ahead without the ability of  others to block. 
This implies a non-MFN plurilateral, in other words one that excludes China and other emerging 
powers.33 
29  A distinction has been made between benign and malign mercantilism. The former consists of  short-term measures 
to ease the costs of  adjustment to shifts in patterns of  trade, such as safeguard measures, that do not threaten the 
open trading system. Malign mercantilism is the sustained use of  power and economic influence to enhance the 
relative position of  a country in a manner that undermines the established order.
30  This seems unlikely even for the Trump administration and there is very broad based support for the WTO across 
US business and in Congress.
31  See Commission Concept note op. cit and WTO communiqué from the Buenos Aires Ministerial, 2017 https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/documents_e.htm.
32  See for example, the CSIS debate with six former US Trade Representatives from both Republican and Democrat 
administrations. https://www.csis.org/events/conversation-six-former-ustrs-0.
33  This was US policy, for example, with regard to the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA).
EU policy can promote compliance 
and transparency rather than a 
divergent set of  regulatory norms.
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The position of  the Trump administration on plurilateral agreements seems to be negative, given 
the decision to take the US out of  the TPP and President Trump’s preference for bilateral 
negotiations. The EU approach, however, is more in favour of  the retention of  MFN. In other 
words, like-minded parties can work on rules, but the negotiations should be open to all those 
wishing to take part, and the benefits should be extended on an MFN basis to all WTO members.34 
This is important because trade rules are only effective if  there is buy-in from all the key players. 
Some of  the topics proposed for plurilateral initiatives at the Buenos Aires WTO ministerial in 
November 2017, might gain support from a wide range of  WTO members, such as e-commerce, 
subsidies on fish,35 or enhanced transparency measures, But plurilateral negotiations on subsidies or 
state-owned enterprises without the emerging members of  the WTO would be divisive.
In the longer term the goal of  the EU should be to promote a broad consensus on trade and 
investment rules. It will probably have to do so through number of  forums. The OECD is no 
longer the legitimate forum for developing norms because it is not inclusive of  the emerging 
economies. The WTO cannot be relied upon, as it is more a forum for negotiating reciprocal 
commitments, so developing countries have been suspicious of  any new issues introduced by the 
developed economies, which they see as part of  a bargaining process.36 To date, the G20 has not 
proven to be very effective in dealing with some of  the main tensions in trade relations.
7.3 Preferential trade agreements
Another vehicle for the EU to influence trade and investment is preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs). These have come to dominate trade policy in the absence of  sufficient progress on 
multilateral rules that keep pace with markets. The content of  EU preferential trade policy is clearly 
an expression of  EU aims and objectives. After unsuccessfully seeking a comprehensive multilateral 
trade and investment agenda in the Doha Development Agenda, the EU reluctantly—and after 
other major WTO members—shifted to a policy of  promoting a comprehensive agenda in PTAs 
(Woolcock, 2007). In its PTA approach, the EU has pursued a de facto differentiation policy, 
something that is needed at the multilateral level if  there is to be progress in the WTO. 37 In 
agreements with developed market economies, such as Canada, Japan, and Singapore, it has pushed 
for coverage of  a full range of  non-tariff  measures, government procurement, competition, and 
investment. In PTAs with middle-income countries it has accepted a less-extensive coverage of  
rules and less than full reciprocity, and in the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 
34  This remains a contentious question in the WTO. For plurilateral agreementsto come under the WTO, a consensus 
of  all members is required (Annex 4 of  the WTO agreement) see Woolcock, 2016. But emerging market members 
such as India, China, and Brazil have refused to approve any plurilateral approaches, which they see (with some 
justification) as an effort to re-establish the leadership function of  the OECD club. 
35  China has, however, held up negotiations on reducing subsidies for fishing fleets.
36  China, India, and some other emerging countries have explicitly opposed any change in the WTO rules that would 
deny them the power to veto the inclusion of  plurilateral agreements under Annex 4 of  the agreement establishing 
the WTO.
37  Differentiation here means differing commitments according to the level of  development of  the country concerned. 
In the WTO to date, differentiation has been largely between developed and developing, with so-called self-
declaration of  developing country status. But the current trading system is no longer predominantly north-south, it is 
multi-polar with economies at very different levels of  development. China still claims developing-country status, but 
is a leading trading nation of  clear systemic importance.
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developing countries it has included some transparency provisions but otherwise only rendezvous 
clauses (i.e. agreement to negotiate sometime in the future) and less-binding obligations on the 
so-called Singapore agenda topics.38
The question for EU PTA policy is whether it can ensure that the PTAs it negotiates are reasonably 
compatible with multilateralism, even though the tariff  and other market access provisions of  PTAs 
are discriminatory. There is an argument that PTAs negotiated between two parties will result in a 
proliferation of  PTAs as third countries seek to negotiate equivalent access to re-establish a level 
playing field. The desire to ensure a level playing field does indeed appear to be a major factor 
shaping PTA initiatives. The danger here is that divergence in the rules elements of  PTAs will result 
in added complexity. To date, the EU PTA agreements have tended to be WTO-plus39 in terms of  
implementation, rather than adopting radically divergent rules. EU policy can therefore promote 
compliance and transparency rather than a divergent set of  regulatory norms. 
7.4 Autonomous trade policy
In addition to the multilateral, plurilateral, and preferential, the EU also adopts autonomous trade 
policy, such as in the form of  the tariff-free preferences for 
least developed countries under the Everything But Arms 
(EBA) policy and applies Generalised System of  Preferences 
(GSP) vis-à-vis developing countries. By offering more-
favourable terms to least-developed economies, the EU 
therefore seeks to introduce a form of  differentiation between 
countries according to their level of  development.
Finally, the EU applies trade instruments such as anti-
dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguard measures to 
address ‘unfair trade’ measures and provide protection for sectors that are adversely affected by 
unforeseen surges in imports. In this way the EU implements the existing GATT/WTO rules that 
govern the use of  such instruments. The application of  the GATT anti-dumping rules by the EU 
has varied over time. Once one of  the most frequent users of  anti-dumping actions, the EU’s use 
of  anti-dumping decreased during the 2000s, probably due to the growth of  global supply chains 
(Messerlin and Woolcock, 2012) and remains far lower than that of  the USA or India. International 
companies that import intermediate products do not want to have to pay anti-dumping duties. The 
shift from interest- or industry-based trade policymaking is also probably a factor. 
The EU makes less use than, for example, the United States or India of  countervailing measures to 
counteract the distortive effects of  subsidies provided by other countries. The EU also makes 
limited use of  safeguard measures. Taken together, these trade instruments provide a means of  
38  The ‘Singapore agenda items’ were those topics (investment, competition, public procurement, and trade facilitation) 
that the EU and other OECD economies sought to get on the WTO agenda at the Singapore WTO ministerial 
meeting in 1996.
39  WTO-plus means provisions in PTAs that go beyond the scope of  existing WTO rules.
An effective EU policy on  
international trade and investment 
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an open, rules-based world trade and 
investment order.
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managing the process of  adjustment and defending EU sectors when other countries pursue ‘unfair 
trade’ as defined in the respective GATT articles and WTO agreements. What the EU does not 
have, as noted above, is a general trade instrument based on a purely EU definition of  what is 
unfair trade. 
7.5 Summing up
An effective EU policy on international trade and investment is important for the EU in terms of  
ensuring access to future growth markets and promoting sustainable development. But it is equally 
important for the maintenance of  an open, rules-based world trade and investment order. At a time 
of  major structural changes in the world trading system, the EU’s role is as a key pillar of  such an 
open, rules-based system. The EU cannot, however, achieve this aim alone, and will need to 
cooperate with like-minded countries that share this broad aim. To date, the EU has shared 
leadership with the US, but this is no longer a viable option, at least for the present given the 
Trump administration’s preference for bilateral negotiations and apparent reluctance to share 
leadership. In trade as in foreign and security policy, the EU is faced with a major rupture in 
transatlantic cooperation. Given its relative strength in trade policy, however, the EU can and 
should be able to shift away from the default of  shared transatlantic leadership of  the trading 
system and work with other countries to maintain a stable trade and investment order. The EU’s 
capability to play a coherent and effective role in pursuit of  these general aims requires the 
establishment of  an effective trade-policy regime that integrates all three EU-level institutions. It 
also requires the (re)establishment of  a broad political consensus on the scope and aims of  EU 
trade and investment policy, something that can only be achieved with the full engagement of  
member state governments and stakeholders in an informed debate.
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